INTRODUCTION
To many people in the United States and abroad, the Bush regime is known primarily for the international mess it has created as the world's only superpower, and for the way it has sacrificed long-accepted legal norms-military and civilian, international and domestic-in the name of its so-called War on Terror.' These violations of legal norms can be divided into two categories: (1) domestic repression, as exemplified by the PATRIOT Act 2 and surveillance projects; 3 and (2) the brutality and denial of legal obligations toward enemy non-Americans at Abu Gharib and the Guantdnamo detention camps, as well as rejection of the Torture Conventions 4 and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War. 5 Most recently, Congress approved the denial of judicial review (through habeas corpus) of the so-called "military tribunals" for alleged terrorist combatants-tribunals that are empowered to proceed, after years of legal blackout, without informing defendants of the evidence against them or allowing them to confront either the evidence or their accusers. 6 We all hope, even pray, that these changes have not become-and will not become-hardwired, permanent features of U.S. law at home or U.S. policy abroad. It is ultimately too early to tell. How will the Iraqi debacle end? Will that war end with the United States receiving a bloody nose, retreating from its transient and aberrant form of Empire back to a more modest position? Will the next administration repair the damage by winning back allies? relaxing adversaries? settling regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East, with a more modest realpolitische approach? and cooling the world temperature (literally and metaphorically)?
Or are we only at the beginning of a period in which the sole hegemon, a reactionary United States run by the rich and religious, embarks on various ideological crusades to promote its peculiar way of life? Are we being led into a "clash of civilizations"-one where both sides, all sides, are marked by aggression and intolerance without end? 7 Are there bases for domestic resistance within the United States? So far, we have seen very little resistance as the Bush regime has successfully employed a reckless policy-one that permits no visible economic sacrifices (quite the opposite) and no levie en masse military draft, while it successfully deflects mass public attention from its military failures, domestic incompetence, and corruption by posturing about and manipulating terrorism concerns. In the absence of a serious opposition party or organized civil society, effective opposition may only develop following repeated defeats in the international arena.
Finally, is "the West," the liberal and social democratic Atlantic World as we have known it for sixty years, a thing of the past? Is the pressure of a demographic crisis and an Islamic presence in Europe, combined with an unanchored America, too much for "the West," as we know it, to bear? I will return later to the issue of whether "the West" is now a smokescreen for naked U.S. power, or whether Europe can provide an embedding of U.S. power as the European Union ("EU") and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") earlier did for Germany. 8 Or has the U.S.-supported expansion of the EU and NATO thinned and undercut an already weak and divided Europe? Should we, as Americans, ask our friends and allies abroad then for taming A la Blair or for your resistance, for multilateralism, or for outright opposition?
The Bush regime's ability to transform the United States, the [Vol. 62:249 "indispensable" hegemon, 9 into the source of disorder and disaster in one land after another has its roots in Bush's own illegitimacy, as well as in our national arrogance and incompetence. I am inclined to trace much of the energy, aggression, and (ultimately) crimes of this government back to the regime's original illegitimacy and its subsequent need to legitimate itself. Much can be understood about the Bush government through the lens of Bochum historian Hans Mommsen in his discussions of the Nazi regime and its leadership. 10 I do not mean to suggest that the agendas, practices, or goals of the two are the same, or that the crimes, so far, are of the same order. I will in fact argue that a sincere postholocaust, assertive human-rights consciousness, as well as a parallel hypocritical ideology, are essential to understanding the Bush regime's policies." But I do mean to suggest that there are some useful and illuminating comparisons to be made between the United States' current government and others with which we are not usually associated.
II. THE BUSH COUP
The coalition that was put together around the pallid, dull, and almost clownish George W. Bush in 2000 continued the conservative Republican strategy developed by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. It 9. It should be noted that the description of the United States as the world's "indispensable nation"-able to see into the future and use force when necessary-was articulated already by Madeleine Albright in the Clinton years. See Interview by Matt Lauer with Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, on NBC (Feb. 19, 1998) , available at http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/ 19/98021907_tpo.html. It is not surprising that after the Soviet Union fell and the EU failed to assert a common and strong military posture, hegemonic thinking in the United States became irresistible. We cannot know where Clinton foreign policy was headed, particularly after the failure of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. intended, above all, to dismantle further the welfare state and empower U.S. elites, while promoting so-called traditional values.
1 2 Its strategy consisted, as it has all along, of economic elites and the media they control preaching the antigovernment gospel of tax reduction and the free market; and anti-left, religious self-employed business owners and white-collar employees or Mittelstdndler in the "new" south and mountain west especially, whose underappreciated belief in God and rugged individualism are as difficult to understand and deconstruct today as they were when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote so lavishly about them in the middle of the nineteenth century.' 3 As to Bush, we should remember how that other great commentator of the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx, could describe Louis Napoleon as a clown-a farcical recurrence of his great uncleln-which, however, didn't prevent the successful coup d'etat of 18th Brumaire. Likewise, George W. was but a farcical diclassi repeat of his father, only now without a Soviet Union to encourage caution in the world. In retrospect, seven years after George W.'s election, it is salutary to recall Mommsen's argument that Hitler, too, was a weak and unimpressive leader in many respects, often detached from key decisions both before and after he took office. 5 Unlike 1851, 1922, 1933, 16 and other years that witnessed coups d'6tat or historical transitions of political power, 2000 was not an auspicious year for an opposition victory, let alone a radical change. Despite the deep sins Bill Clinton had committed against the nation's puritanical soul, and despite his decision to move the Democratic Party even further to the right on nearly all domestic issues, he was fortunate to oversee a period of broad growth and full employment. So, it took something of a coup d'6tat for Bush to become President. 1 3 This is true and reprehensible; yet it undervalues the fascistic moves, or Zige, that preceded it. These consisted of two major efforts, one culminating on Election Day and the other on display during the critical moments of the recounting process.
First, relying on trustworthy knowledge that almost 90% of former felons vote Democrat, 2 4 and knowing that available racist sentiment would back them up, Florida Republicans voted to spend $4 million to purge approximately 8,000 former felons from the voter rolls (including, as it turned out, 2,883 who were absolutely entitled to vote, having committed their crimes in previous states of residence where felons were not disqualified), along with a still-unknown number of false positives disqualified in a deliberately, but not randomly, overbroad search. 25 This came after Republicans rejected a bill to spend $100,000 for voter education. 26 These "disqualifications" were first activated and effective on the day of the 2000 election so that there was no opportunity for counterchallenge or remedy. 7 So did the southern ancien regime overturn the Voting Rights Act, 2 8 the jewel of the 1960s civil-rights movement, at least for this occasion. As much as the Weimar period elites hated popular democracy and universal suffrage, 29 [Vol. 62:249
Second, are the truly remarkable but still underappreciated events in Miami on the 22nd and 23rd of November 2000. After an automatic machine recount reduced Bush's Florida lead from 1,700 votes to 327 votes, 3 0 the Florida Supreme Court ordered a full recount in several counties, including Miami-Dade. 3 As the hand recoants showed a definite trend, with a more than sufficient gain for Gore, the recount in Miami was shut down and reversed. To read mainstream press accounts of those days is frightening still, and they underscore what circumstances made this President:
After a furious demonstration by Republicans, Miami-Dade County election officials stunned both sides in the bitter contest for Florida's presidential vote and decided unanimously today to end their recount of 654,000 ballots.
The recount began on [November 20, 2000] . By the time it came to end today, Mr. Gore had gained 157 votes with 99 of 614 precincts counted. 32 The next day we learned some of the particulars of this "furious demonstration."
The Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's decision [yesterday] to shut down its hand recount ... followed a rapid campaign of public pressure that at least one of the board's three members says helped persuade him to vote to stop the counting. Geller, chairman of the Miami-Dade Democratic Party, was escorted to safety by the police after a crowd chased him down and accused him of stealing a ballot. Upstairs in the Clark center, several people were trampled, punched or kicked when protesters tried to rush the doors outside the office of the Miami-Dade supervisor of elections.... When the ruckus was over, the protesters had what they had wanted: a unanimous vote by the board to call off the hand counting.
Republican supporters scoffed at the accusation that they had engaged in a scheme of intimidation, saying the protest had been nothing more than a spontaneous manifestation of people's anger. 
III. REICHSTAGSBRAND AND ERMACHTIGUNGSGESETZ-, SEPTEMBER 11
AND THE PATRIOT ACT Given the enormity of the Nazis' crimes and deviousness, it has taken a long time to accept the proposition that the Nazis actually did not themselves torch the Reichstag to create a crisis that would enable them to eliminate their opponents and tighten their grip on the nation. The arson of the Reichstag took place more or less as the government claimed. 34 The "genius" of the Nazis, so difficult for rationalists to accept, lay not primarily in lies and deceptions (though certainly there 33 [Vol. 62:249 were plenty of those), but in being able to exaggerate and transform a real attack by their enemies and to use it for their own ends. "Sweet are the uses of adversity / Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, / Wears yet a precious jewel in his head . . .,, " With al Qaeda's attacks of September 11 and the more than 3000 deaths they caused, 36 the United States was attacked in the Homelandnot the furthest reaches of the distant territory of Hawaii as in 1941, but at its very iconic centers of business and military power, the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington. This was almost inconceivable to Americans. In fact, the very word homeland subsequently had to be rescued from linguistic obscurity. 37 (Of course, the iconic value of the Reichstag, inscribed with its dedication "To the German People," should not be understated either, and having suffered recent invasions, the resonance of Heimat to Germans was immediate. 38 )
It was widely-and correctly-remarked at the time that George W. Bush became President not upon his inauguration in January 2001, but instead on September 11-or at least whenever he resurfaced from hiding (until which time it seemed that Mayor Giuliani of New York was in charge). That was the moment of Bush's Reichstag fire. Whether one considers Bush a strong and central figure or, following the Mommsonian analysis (which certainly seems persuasive to anyone with a vivid recollection of the moment), the product of his supporters, it was the turning point. 39 Unable to become a President by legitimate election, he now proved able to legitimate the presidency he occupied by building and fighting a struggle against terrorism, from that day onward and through the [Vol. 62:249 ing that al Qaeda was planning an imminent attack against the United
States by crashing hijacked planes into major buildings. 41 What followed with astounding rapidity (thirty days) was the USA Quickly, and whether coincidental or otherwise, the well-founded panic of September 11 was exacerbated by a mysterious and never-solved anthrax bio-terrorism panic less than two months later. 48 In Mommsonian fashion, things were just happening, and with each such development, the underachieving dolt, the perpetually vacationing mediocrity personified was transformed into a steely commander in chief. Louis Napoleon the flop might soon don the purple robes of Emperor Napoleon III. been ignored. 5 6 An unknown number of others were invited for interviews by security agencies from which they did not return for extended periods. 5 7 Another fifty or so individuals were held as "material witnesses" and temporarily disappeared without ever being charged or called to be witnesses to anything. 58 No one may ever know how many people were detained or rendered overseas (perhaps for
In contrast, the Ermdchtigungsgesetz was derived from Hindenburg's Reichstagsbrandverordnung, formally the Order "for the Protection of the People and the Nation" (zum Schutz von Volk und Staat). 60 It too had been a brief declaration: a one-sentence decree issued the day after the Reichtag arson, restricting habeas corpus, freedom of assembly and organization, press rights, and the requirements for warrants to search homes or monitor electronic communications. 6 ' Under its authority, about 10,000 people, mostly Communists, were arrested during the next two weeks. 62 Before long, Nazi military success, economic recovery, and the cowardice of Germany's enemies made domestic repression less necessary, at least until the military tide turned. As Hermann Goering later explained it while at Nuremberg:
[T]he people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. [Vol. 62:249
That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.
6 3
Of course, we Americans have been told that such comparisons, perhaps phenomenological, can harm the United States and endanger national unity. It is supposed to mean something different when Bush declares that "my most important job as your President is to defend the homeland."' Or as Attorney General, John Ashcroft, rather menacingly put in while championing the PATRIOT Act in December 2001, "[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty[,] my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. ' 6 ' To rephrase a recent observation by Claus Offe, the bootstrapping argument of the Bush regime is the following: "If our government adopts measures of this sort, then just imagine how acute and ubiquitous the dangers must be that it thereby protects against" 66 -not to mention how necessary and legitimate our own government must be. Such a government can do whatever it wants and its leaders ought not to be challenged.
The Bush Ermdchtigung and the legitimation of a presidency never democratically attained therefore both depend on the construction of a grave terrorist threat and the need for Ashcroft's and his successors' unembarrassed repression at home. The result is what Offe describesacutely-as an intensified long-term fear of terrorism that accompanies a "second order" regime terrorism (voiced especially by the vice president, secretary of defense, and selected congressional party leaders). 67 Working from the customary description of terrorism allows-again in Mommsonian fashion-for a regime of self escalation. 6 " Terrorists use illegal methods to induce and spread fear and dread in a population in 63. G.M. GILBERT 
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order to gain political advantage. What the "Bushies" have done is the following: "(a) at the risk of and sometimes through the very use of illegal means accomplish (b) the spread of fear and dread throughout the dramatization of and warnings of terrorism (c) for the purpose of anchoring and enhancing political power.
6 9 Instead of fear generated by the brutal acts of "real" terrorists, the empowered regime unhesitatingly escalates "multifaceted and derisive assaults on and suspensions of civil and human rights way beyond any measure of the requisite, proportionate, or rechtstaatlich." ' 7 Being the hegemon means that such practices will be contagious and become accepted by at least some U.S. allies. Being the hegemon also means that the foreign-policy interests of the United States, as construed and articulated by the self-legitimating regime itself, are perforce the interests of all so that no other state can or should stop the United States from pursuing these interests. A long tradition in political theory accepts the role of the hegemon as the pivot of order and stability. 71 Yet this is, of course, a very dangerous business, as the Berlin legal theorist Ulrich PreuB has made clear. 7 2 When a power is the protector of the international constitution, so to speak, the very real danger exists that "the enemies of the hegemonic state appear to be the enemies of all humanity .... It could be, then, that the democratic hegemon is not the answer to the problem of global order but rather perhaps the problem itself. Enter theorists Carl Schmitt and John Yoo. The defense of such extraordinary measures lies in the claim that the United States faces an existential threat. Such an existential threat cannot be managed from within a conventional constitutional legal framework, it is argued, because it is simply too dire. Theories of a strong executive and expanded wartime executive powers are hardly new in the United States, but they have rarely been pushed so far or so hard. 75 What is certain is that the treatment of enemy combatants and the current issues of torture, either Geneva Treaty protections or U.S. court review is the outwardfacing aspect of the same power that permits the abridgment of domestic freedoms. 78 are all of a piece. It is at the moment of such emergency-of the exception-that we find the font of sovereignty and learn who is sovereign.
As is well known, Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Weimar Constitution read: "In case public safety is seriously threatened or disturbed, the Reich President may take the measures necessary to reestablish law and order, if necessary using armed force. In the pursuit of this aim he may suspend the civil rights described in articles ... partially or entirely. 84 The benign interpretation of this power, at the time and ever since, has been that democracies must be militant in their own defense against serious threats and that, therefore, protecting the constitution can sometimes require suspending or going outside of it. Thus, the guardian of the constitution-der Huiter der Verfafung-inevitably the Executive, the President, turns out to be the one who goes outside the constitution. Still, under this benign theory of the exception, the power to declare the state of emergency is found in the constitution, 85 and so the sovereign must respect constitutional restraints on the exercise of that power.
Inevitably, however, such restraints prove illusory, and so in the Schmittian version, and perhaps in the incipient U.S. version as well, the sover- [Vol. 62:249 eign comes to operate in a legal black hole, turned perhaps into a gray hole by broad legislative empowerment or indemnification.
Indeed, in a linguistic twist stranger even than the rediscovery of "homeland," President Bush has discovered a theory of his extra-legal virtual self or Eigentlichkeit, namely that he is "The Decider." 86 And it is "The Decider" who is sovereign: On this, Carl Schmitt and John Yoo agree, as both normalize the exception. The corresponding theoretical construct has been that of the "unitary executive"-the sovereign is the one who decides both whether there is an emergency and what to do about it (Souverin ist wer fiber den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet). That formula has been accompanied by the suggestion that a constitutional change has occurred. 8 7 Statutes from the 1970s that protected civil liberties are now declared outmoded, and the war-regulating understandings of international law emerging from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam are declared "quaint" relics. 88 Gonzales's position, by the way, is the same one adopted at Nuremberg by Wilhelm Keitel-where it helped land him a noose around his neck. 8 9 Going forward, the "unitary executive" is alleged necessary for fighting an indefinite war on terrorism or Islamo-Fascism, a competing moral absolutism: "In America... the voice of the people is the voice of God," 9 and our own sense of moral rightness has driven the development of a domestic side to the 86. Many critics have seen this as just another example of Bush's difficulties with the language, but there is a nonrandomness to his selection: It conflates religious decision-making authorities (such as talmudic "decisors") with the tie-breaking procedures in racing ("deciders"). commander-in-chief power, and the perception of the U.S. "Homeland" as a theater of war. The Bush legal thinkers simply reject the argument, associated with Dicey 9 ' and the British, but also Kelsen, 9 2 that the sovereign simply has no authority to suspend the constitution as long as the ordinary courts of law are open and able to function. 93 A little bit of legality to cover a "unitary executive's" power grab is arguably worse if, as we have repeatedly seen since September 11, demi-legality facilitates the seepage of repression into ever-larger areas of life. 94 In the end, congressional approval of the new Military Commissions Act, for example, amounts to no more than a formally legal delegation of unchecked authority, a further Ermdchtigung, an in-advance indemnification of executive lawbreaking. 95 If "The Decider" continues on this path, then the next step would be "rule by prerogative" governing certain, ever-expanding "security" domains while the "rule of law" continued to govern other areas. That would leave us embarked on what Ernst Fraenkel described as "The Dual State." 96 Objections to the movement toward a fascistic dual state have been met at every stage with both governmental and professional incredulity and outrage. How dare one compare the United States to a dictatorship.
The argument goes that perhaps there have been necessary-if-unattractive measures (Guantdnamo, torture memos, immigrant abuse, warrantless searches, and eavesdropping), but these have been in response to real threats and should not be compared with regimes that have simply subverted and destroyed the rule of law. 97 But neither a Reich nor a Diktatur is built in a day. Even after enjoying a monopoly of power for a full year, the Nazi Minister of Justice condemned and even prosecuted cruelty in the concentration camps. 98 Indicting a case of water torture (!), the Reichsminister wrote:
The nature of the assault, especially the use of water torture, reveals a brutality and cruelty on the part of the perpetrator that is alien to German sensibilities and feelings. These cruelties, reminiscent of oriental sadism, can neither be explained nor excused by even the most extreme form of hatred in battle. 98. "Hatred in battle" was recognized and allowed by the Lieber Code, which was developed during the U.S. Civil War. FRANCIS Dec. 14, 2007 , at A28 ("The outcome was a significant defeat for the Bush administration, which had described the case as a major crackdown on homegrown terrorists."). Despite the acquittal of one defendant, a legal permanent-resident immigrant, the vindictiveness of the regime is used to cover up its own evil: The government is moving to deport the exonerated defendant on the theory that associating with terrorists is a deportable offense and that, even though he was acquitted by a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the defendant would have lost under a "preponderance" standard, which is all that is necessary for deportability because it is a civil, not a criminal, issue. I began this analysis by insisting that a sincere post-holocaust, assertive human-rights consciousness as well as a parallel hypocritical ideology were both essential to understanding the Bush regime. Permit me to close by elaborating briefly on this point. Only a few years ago, one of the leading liberal human-rights figures in the United States, Samantha Power," 3 argued that holocaust consciousness was extremely important in politics because it provided "a moral life preserver in a sea of interest-based callousness."" ' 4 From Armenia to Auschwitz, from the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, and from Rwanda to Iraq, the cycle of "interest-based callousness"" ' 5 has permitted evil forces to destroy millions of lives. But in the new era of global human-rights consciousness and readiness to intervene, there would be fewer dictators and yet fewer killers. For the Pinochets, no harbor; for the Milosevics, no quarter; for the Hutu death squads, no looking away; and for the tyrants like Saddam Hussein, no more toleration, regardless of the oil they might have to offer the greedy countries of the West.' 16 There would be no more concessions to tyrants, such as those offered by Donald Rumsfeld to Saddam Hussein."
world of "interest-based callousness" rationalized as a structure of security. 3 9
But as we now know, the end of the Soviet Union meant something altogether different. Rather than, for example, enabling the United Nations to build on its post-WWII treaties and initiatives and rather than bringing broadly accepted human-rights norms to bear on all, the world found itself subjected to a hyper-dominant military and economic power in the form of the United States. The absence of what U.S. state theorists domestically call "countervailing powers" would soon prove dangerous. 4° What liberal human-rights advocates could not know is that they were helping to prepare the ideological ground for the projection of the power of the United States by supplying a new liberal imperialist discourse. What no one could know was that, within a decade or so, that power would pass into the hands of an aggressive but petty and incompetent figure like Bush, surrounded by the basest members of his class. Together, they would steal an election and then use a vile and depraved, but nonetheless limited, attack by a tiny group of criminal terrorists 14 to run amok at home and abroad. The question that remains is whether the Bush regime is a brief, illegitimate, and repressive episode disturbing an otherwise largely stable United States Empire, or whether, as with the French Second Empire and the German Third Reich, only defeat abroad will topple the leader and reverse the course of events. But what if there is no power capable of defeating the American Empire? Is a Vietnam Quagmire, a morass or two, enough? 1 42 What if change must instead await either the recovery of the American people's own good sense, or the slow erosion of the specific political economy undergirding its wealth and power.
